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Abstract
This paper analyzes whether the Congressional budget process (instituted in
1974) leads to lower aggregate spending than does the piece-meal appropriations
process that preceded it. Previous theoretical analysis, using spatial models of
legislator preferences, is inconclusive. This paper uses a model of interest group
lobbying, where a legislature determines spending on a national public good and
on subsidies to subsets of the population that belong to nationwide sector-specific
interest groups. In the appropriations process, the Appropriations Committee proposes a budget, maximizing the joint welfare of voters and the interest groups, that
leads to overspending on subsidies. In the budget process, a Budget Committee
proposes an aggregate level of spending (the budget resolution); the Appropriations Committee then proposes a budget. If the lobby groups are not subject to a
binding resource constraint, the two institutional structures lead to identical outcomes. With such a constraint, however, there is a free rider problem among the
groups in lobbying the Budget Committee, as each group only obtains a small
fraction of the benefits from increasing the aggregate budget. If the number of
groups is sufficiently large, each takes the budget resolution as given, and lobbies
only the Appropriations Committee. The main results are that aggregate spending
is lower, and social welfare higher, under the budget process; however, provision
of the public good is suboptimal. The paper also presents two extensions: the
first endogenizes the enforcement of the budget resolution by incorporating the
relevant procedural rules into the model. The second analyzes statutory budget
rules that limit spending levels, but can be revised by a simple majority vote. In
each case,the free rider problem prevents the groups from securing the required
changes to procedural and budget rules.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes whether the Congressional budget process (instituted in 1974) leads to lower aggregate spending than does the piecemeal appropriations process that preceded it. Previous theoretical
analysis, using spatial models of legislator preferences, is inconclusive.
This paper uses a model of interest group lobbying, where a legislature determines spending on a national public good and on subsidies
to subsets of the population that belong to nationwide sector-specific
interest groups. In the ‘appropriations process’, the Appropriations
Committee proposes a budget, maximizing the joint welfare of voters and the interest groups, that leads to overspending on subsidies.
In the ‘budget process’, a Budget Committee proposes an aggregate
level of spending (the ‘budget resolution’); the Appropriations Committee then proposes a budget. If the lobby groups are not subject to
a binding resource constraint, the two institutional structures lead to
identical outcomes. With such a constraint, however, there is a free
rider problem among the groups in lobbying the Budget Committee, as
each group only obtains a small fraction of the benefits from increasing the aggregate budget. If the number of groups is suﬃciently large,
each takes the budget resolution as given, and lobbies only the Appropriations Committee. The main results are that aggregate spending is
lower, and social welfare higher, under the budget process; however,
provision of the public good is suboptimal. The paper also presents two
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extensions: the first endogenizes the enforcement of the budget resolution by incorporating the relevant procedural rules into the model.
The second analyzes statutory budget rules that limit spending levels,
but can be revised by a simple majority vote. In each case, the free
rider problem prevents the groups from securing the required changes
to procedural and budget rules.
JEL Classification: H61; D72; D78
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Introduction

Prior to reforms enacted in 1974, Congress followed a piecemeal approach to
budgeting. Spending bills for diﬀerent areas were voted on independently;
the aggregate level of spending was not directly chosen, being determined instead as a residual. The 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (also known simply as the Congressional Budget Act, and hereafter
referred to as CBA74) transformed the institutional structure of Congressional budgeting. In particular, CBA74 created the Budget Committees,
charged with reporting a budget resolution setting a target level of total
spending. Procedural devices (such as substantive points of order) were
instituted to enforce the limits specified in the resolution on the authorizing and appropriations committees. This institutional shift towards what is
known as the ‘budget process’1 appears to have been motivated by a desire
on the part of many in Congress to restrain spending levels (e.g. Schick,
1995, pp. 70f; Davis, 1997, pp. 14f).
CBA74 was followed, of course, by a period of high deficits, particularly
in the early and mid-1980’s. This has understandably led to skepticism
about the eﬀectiveness of the reforms. Moreover, in response to concern over
these deficits, the budget process specified in CBA74 has been supplemented
by various budget rules establishing deficit or spending limits.2 Table 1
shows total Federal outlays as a percentage of GDP for fiscal years 1962-1974
and 1975-2000 (based on figures in Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2001)); this
suggests that aggregate spending levels have risen since CBA74. However,
Table 2 shows that there has been a reduction in discretionary spending (the
component of Federal outlays that is subject to annual appropriations, and
thus presumably most susceptible to the discipline of the budget process) in
1
A general definition of the Congressional budget process is that it “consists of the
consideration and adoption of spending, revenue, and debt-limit legislation within the
framework of an annual concurrent resolution on the budget” (US Library of Congress,
1999, p. 1).
2
For an overview, see Davis (1997).

2

the period since CBA74.
Of course, any empirical assessment of CBA74 is fraught with diﬃculty,
particularly as the counterfactual (aggregate spending had the reforms not
occurred) cannot be known. Consequently, a theoretical understanding of
the eﬀects of this institutional change is of paramount importance, especially
in view of current proposals to reform budgeting procedures in Congress.3 A
well-known paper in the political science literature (Ferejohn and Krehbiel,
1987) develops a formal analysis of the consequences of the CBA74 reforms,
contrasting an ‘appropriations process’ (corresponding to budgeting prior to
the reforms) and a ‘budget process’ (following the reforms). Using a spatial
model where legislators have Euclidean preferences over a multi-dimensional
budget, they conclude that the relative levels of aggregate spending under
the appropriations and budget processes depend on the configuration of
legislators’ preferences. In particular, they find that there are circumstances
in which the budget process can lead to higher levels of aggregate spending.
The aim of this paper is to reexamine the impact of CBA74 on aggregate
spending, using a model that draws on recent advances in the economic theory of interest group lobbying. The setting is a legislature where legislators
represent identical districts (to abstract from particularistic local considerations). Subsets of the population belong to nationwide sector-specific (but
not district-specific) interest groups that potentially benefit from Federal
spending (in the form of ‘subsidies’) on their sectors. In the ‘appropriations
process’, the Appropriations Committee proposes a budget (i.e. a level of
spending on a national public good and on subsidies for each organized sector). The committee maximizes the joint welfare of its voters and the interest
groups, subject to the constraint that the proposal attracts majority support
in the legislature, leading to optimal spending on the public good, but overspending on subsidies. In the ‘budget process’, there is a Budget Committee
as well as an Appropriations Committee. The former proposes an aggregate
level of spending (a ‘budget resolution’) and the latter then proposes a budget (subject to the budget resolution). Each committee maximizes the joint
welfare of its voters and those interest groups that (endogenously) choose
to lobby it.
It is first shown that, if the lobby groups are not subject to a binding
resource constraint on their lobbying activity, the two institutional structures lead to identical outcomes. However, when the interest groups allocate
3

In the 106th Congress, a ‘Comprehensive Budget Process Reform’ bill (HR 853) was
reported by the House Rules Committee, but defeated 166-250 on the floor in May, 2000.
The House Rules Committee held hearings in July, 2001 on a more modest proposal for
biennial budgeting. See Garrett (1998) for a discussion of earlier reform proposals.
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their lobbying resources between the two committees subject to a resource
constraint, the basic intuition is the following. When a group lobbies the
Budget Committee, it only obtains a fraction of the benefits of an increase
in the level of aggregate spending, whereas it obtains all the benefits from
its lobbying of the Appropriations Committee. This creates a free rider
problem among the interest groups at the first (Budget Committee) stage
of the budget process. It is shown below that, if there is a suﬃciently large
number of interest groups, each will take the budget resolution as given,
and choose to lobby only the Appropriations Committee. This aligns the
Budget Committee’s interests with those of voters, and leads it to propose a
budget resolution that lowers aggregate spending (relative to the level that
would have been chosen residually by the Appropriations Committee). It is
also shown that social welfare is higher under the budget process. However,
because the Appropriations Committee retains proposal rights over the allocation of spending (and is lobbied by the interest groups), the decrease
in the size of the budget is obtained at the cost of a reduction in spending
on the national public good below the optimal level (as well as through a
reduction in subsidies).
After establishing this basic result, the paper presents two extensions.
The first endogenizes the enforcement of the budget resolution through substantive points of order and the budget reconciliation process. It is argued
that the basic intuition above also applies in this context. In order to propose
a budget that would violate the budget resolution limits, the Appropriations
Committee needs the cooperation of the Rules Committee (to waive points
of order that prevent such a budget from being considered on the floor).
The free rider problem among the interest groups, however, prevents them
from lobbying the Rules Committee, the interests of which are thus aligned
with the Budget Committee (and voters) in enforcing the budget resolution.
The second extension concerns budget rules that establish limits on
spending (such as the discretionary spending limits that form part the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990), but which can be revised or overturned by a
simple majority. As pointed out by Auerbach (1994) and Gramlich (1995),
such statutory rules pose a puzzle: it would seem that if a majority wished to
spend more than the amount specified in the limit, it could simply revise the
limit upwards. It is argued here that proposal power over revisions to budget rules is generally held by agenda setters (such as the Rules Committee)
other than the spending committees. Thus, assuming that the traditional
jurisdictional property rights of committees are respected, the endogenous
choice by interest groups of which committee to lobby can lead to these rules
restraining spending: the free rider problem among the groups leads each
4

to lobby the spending committee, rather than seek the required revisions to
the budget rule.
This paper diﬀers in significant respects from the existing formal literature on budgeting. By assuming identical districts, it abstracts from the
concerns about district-specific distributive politics that have been emphasized in the earlier literature (e.g. Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981;
Baron and Ferejohn, 1989; Inman and Fitts, 1990; Inman and Rubinfeld,
1996; Baqir, 2001). Instead, the model focuses on the role of nationwide (or
at least widely dispersed) sector-specific interest groups. This is not to suggest that district-specific spending is insignificant, or to downplay the many
contributions of the distributive politics literature. Rather, this modeling
choice reflects a judgment that contemporary budgeting is driven more by
nationwide concerns and pressures than by local ones.4 This view is shared
by many observers of Federal budgeting. For instance, Gramlich (1995, pp.
177-8) argues that recent developments “make irrelevant much of the literature on budget control . . . [featuring] aggrandizing bureaucrats, high-wage
civil servants, and pork barrel projects.” He notes that the type of “spending
that benefits a small group of users where logrolling is possible” analyzed in
this literature has been superseded by spending that “benefits large groups
of users” (p. 185).5 Similarly, Schick (1995, p. 141) cautions against underestimating the role of earmarked appropriations for local projects, but also
warns that: “neither should one believe that the financial crisis in federal
budgeting is due to pork. It is not.”
Many of the themes of this paper are related to those of Persson, Roland
and Tabellini (1997; 2000). In particular, the conclusion of Persson et al.
(1997, p. 1186) concerning the superiority of a two-stage budgeting procedure, and the analogous result in Persson et al. (2000, p. 1143) that
the separation of agenda-setting powers for taxation and spending can be
beneficial, closely resemble the main result of this paper. However, the basic structure of their model is very diﬀerent, focusing on the disciplining
of rent-seeking politicians by voters using retrospective voting rules.6 Pers4

In particular, an important element of this model is that these nationwide interest
groups have the capacity to lobby any legislative committee, rather than being restricted
to influencing one legislator through electoral means.
5
Gramlich (1995) also emphasizes the role of entitlement spending. This is not explicitly part of the model here; however, by focusing on nationwide rather than local spending,
this paper takes a step towards a more realistic analysis of Federal budgeting. For another
discussion of the role of entitlements in the growth Federal spending, see Davis (1997).
6
Persson (1998) uses a model featuring interest group lobbying; however, the strategy
sets of the groups are restricted so that they do not fundamentally diﬀer from voters. In
particular, each interest group is permitted to lobby only one, exogenously given, legislator.
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son et al. (2000) essentially argue that the legislator with agenda setting
power over taxes (and hence over total spending) will be forced by voters
to restrain overall spending in order to reduce the funds available for the
legislator with proposal power over spending to allocate to her district or to
appropriate as rents. In contrast, this paper shows that the committee with
agenda setting power over budget size has an incentive to restrain spending because interest groups (endogenously) choose to lobby the spending
committee. Thus, a two-stage procedure is preferable, even when legislative
districts are identical.
While Persson et al. (2000) do not relate their analysis to the specific
institutional structures of Congress in as much detail as does this paper (as
their focus is on broader cross-national comparisons of political institutions),
the insights developed here complement theirs in many respects. More generally, this paper shares with their work an interest in the development of
positive theories of public finance, and an emphasis on the role of legislative
institutions.
This paper seeks to make a number of contributions. Firstly, it provides
a ‘rational reconstruction’ of why the reformers of 1974 may have expected
CBA74 to reduce spending. It also provides a clearer understanding of
the Congressional budget process, and develops a framework for making
predictions about how various current reform proposals will aﬀect budgetary
outcomes. The case for the theoretical modeling of these issues has been
expressed well by Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987, p. 298):
Given a primary interest in the relative budget sizes that result
from two diﬀerent institutional arrangements but a concomitant
inability to experiment with Congress, a convincing theory of
budgeting is needed to predict budget sizes.
The next section briefly surveys several related branches of literature.
Then, Section 3 presents the basic model. The appropriations process is
analyzed in Section 4, and the budget process in Section 5. Sections 6 and
7 present the two extensions, while Section 8 concludes.

2

Related Literature

This paper is related to a substantial body of literature in economics, political science, law, and public budgeting. This brief review focuses only on
the most salient examples of this literature. Firstly, of course, this paper
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addresses essentially the same question as that posed by Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987). However, this paper diﬀers fundamentally from theirs in using
a model of interest group lobbying. Specifically, it draws on the common
agency lobbying approach of Grossman and Helpman (1994), a framework
that has been extended by Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), who also
apply it to public finance issues.7 However, the current paper does not
explicitly use the menu auction formulation, nor the associated solution
concept of Nash equilibrium in ‘truthful’ campaign contribution schedules.
Rather, all that is assumed here is that eﬃcient bargaining takes place between the legislative committee and the interest groups that (endogenously)
choose to lobby it; the precise form of bargaining is unimportant, as long as
the joint surplus is maximized.8
This paper is also related to recent analyses by economists of the eﬀects
of legislative institutions on policy outcomes, notably Persson et al. (1997;
2000). In this approach, the central issue is an agency problem between
voters and their political representatives, with the latter being able to divert rents to themselves while in oﬃce. The authors employ a moral hazard
framework, based on Ferejohn (1986), in which voters discipline their representatives by adopting retrospective voting rules that involve reelecting
the incumbent only if voters’ utility exceeds a specified level. Persson et
al. (1997) show that a system involving a separation of powers, where the
executive has agenda setting power over the size of the budget, while the
legislature has agenda setting power over its composition, can create a conflict of interest that benefits voters. As long as both branches must agree on
a budget, the take-it-or-leave-it power that Persson et al. (1997) assume for
the agenda setter ensures that the other branch gains nothing from agreeing
to excessive spending, and aligns its interest with that of its voters.
This framework is extended in Persson et al. (2000). In their model of
a ‘Presidential-Congressional’ system (pp. 1137f), they assume that agenda
setting power over the level of taxation (and hence aggregate budget size)
is allocated to one legislator, while another has agenda setting power over
the composition of spending. Because each legislator is accountable to a
diﬀerent district, the former has an incentive to constrain both the latter’s
desire to provide local public goods to her own district and her desire to
divert rents to herself. Persson et al. (2000) conclude that a Presidential7

Dharmapala (1999) uses this approach to analyze tax and budgetary institutions in
Congress, contrasting decisionmaking by a centralized tax committee with policymaking
by decentralized specialized committees.
8
See Goldberg and Maggi (1999) for an example of the use of this eﬃcient bargaining
approach to lobbying.
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Congressional system leads to lower spending and taxes (through both lower
levels of public good provision and lower rents for politicians) than does a
parliamentary system.
As was discussed in the introduction, the themes of Persson et al. (1997;
2000) are closely related to those of this paper. As is evident from this
brief review, however, their model emphasizes substantially diﬀerent features
of legislative budgeting. The modeling choices here reflect those features
that appear most salient when the institutional structures of Congressional
budgeting are closely examined. On the other hand, Persson et al. focus on
more general cross-national comparisons of institutions.
The legal literature on the Federal budget process has also considered
issues of institutional design, albeit informally. Fitts (1990) argues that
there may be benefits to decisionmaking behind a partial ‘veil of ignorance’,
with the decisionmakers being unaware of the precise incidence of the costs
and benefits of their decisions. He suggests that: “ignorance about specific
outcomes can help forge a consensus and create a disincentive against the
singular pursuit of narrow group advantage at least ex ante” (1990, p. 972),
and claims that certain institutional features of Congressional budgeting
may have this eﬀect.
Garrett (1998) presents a similar idea, in the course of a proposal to
reform Federal budgeting practices along ‘functional’ lines (i.e. in such a
way that decisionmaking corresponds to the functional categories of budgeting). In addition, Garrett (2000) poses the question of why Congress
adopts procedures, such as those introduced by CBA74, that lead to policy
outcomes that would (presumably) not be directly chosen. She argues that
the 1974 reforms had the eﬀect of strengthening party leaders at the expense
of committee chairs, and suggests that legislators may have been motivated
to institute such a shift in order to raise the value of the party brand name.
Thus, the legal literature on Congressional budgetary institutions has
discussed issues relevant to this paper. However, this literature does not
(even informally) discuss the interest group free riding idea that is developed
formally in this paper.

3
3.1

The Basic Model
The Political-Economic Framework

This section presents the assumptions of the basic model. The underlying
framework is a political economy in which the legislature (hereafter denoted
L) consists of N identical districts. The assumption of identical districts
8

is intended to abstract away from diﬀerences in the interests of diﬀerent
geographically defined groups (for instance, over the provision of local public
goods) in order to focus on the role of nationwide, sector-specific interest
groups.9 Each district is assumed to have a population of M. Consider
district i ∈ {1, ..., N }; each of the M residents of i belongs to exactly one
of (K + 1) categories. She may be aligned, by virtue of having a sectorspecific endowment, with one of K sector-specific interest groups,10 or she
may have no sector-specific endowment, and be part of a residual population
unrepresented by any interest group. Let Mk be
Pthe number of individuals
who belong to sector k ∈ {1, ..., K} and MI ≡ k Mk be the total number
who belong to all sector-specific groups. Then, M−I = M − MI is the
number of individuals in the district who belong to none of these groups. It
is assumed that Mk > 0∀k and M−I > 0 for each district.
Let Ik denote the set of individuals (nationwide) who belong to group
k; then, let I = ∪Ik be the set of all individuals who belong to any of the
k

sector-specific groups. The salient characteristic of the group members is
that an individual j ∈ Ik derives benefits from a subsidy for sector k, denoted
bk . The benefits are given by the increasing, concave function hk (bk ). All
individuals derive (common) utility from a national public good, the level of
which is denoted G; this utility is also increasing and concave, and denoted
by u(G). Each individual has an (identical) endowment of ω; the public
good and the subsidies are financed by a uniform lump sum tax of t per
head. The welfare of an individual j ∈
/ I is:
Uj = ω − t + u(G)

(1)

The welfare of an individual j ∈ Ik is:
Uj = ω − t + u(G) + hk (bk )

(2)

where it is assumed that:
Assumption 1) u0 (G) > 0, u00 (G) < 0, lim u0 (G) = ∞
G→0

Assumption 2) h0k (bk ) > 0, h00k (bk ) < 0, lim h0k (bk ) = ∞∀k = 1, ..., K
bk →0

9

These could represent, for instance, such constituencies as farmers, veterans, defense
industry workers, welfare recipients, and the aged. District-based interests and local public
goods could be introduced without fundamentally altering the results, as long as at least
some interest groups can choose which legislators to lobby.
10
Note that an individual is assumed to belong to at most one interest group; membership in multiple groups could be accommodated without fundamentally aﬀecting the
results, but leads to greater complexity.
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That is, u(G) and each hk (bk ) is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
The Inada-type conditions ensure interior solutions in the analysis that follows. It is also assumed that ω is suﬃciently large that the ‘endowment
constraint’ on taxation (i.e. the constraint that t ≤ ω) is never binding in
the analysis below.
The aggregate welfare of district i can be obtained by summing the
expressions in Equations (1) and (2), weighted by the number of individuals
in each group. Without loss of generality, it is possible to normalize M to
1, and to define mk = Mk /M as the proportion (number when M = 1) of
/ I).
individuals j ∈ Ik (with m−I being the proportion of individuals j ∈
Then, the aggregate welfare of district i, denoted Wi is:
X
Wi = ω − t + u(G) +
mk hk (bk )
(3)
k

P
as m−I + k mk = 1. Note that, as all districts are identical, this expression
is the same ∀i; thus, the subscript will be omitted in the analysis that follows.

3.2

Budgetary Policy and the Socially Optimal Budget

The legislature’s task is to enact a budget, specifying a level of spending on
the public good G and a level bk of each of the K sector-specific subsidies,
subject to the budget constraint (hereafter denoted BC) that aggregate taxes
N t are suﬃcient to finance these expenditures.11 More formally:
Definition (‘Budget’): A budget {G, b} is an allocation consisting of
G ∈ <+ and a K-dimensional vector b ∈ <K
+ , and implicitly defining a tax
t ∈ [0, ω], such that the budget constraint (BC):
X
G+
bk ≤ Nt
(4)
k

is satisfied.
This paper’s aims are primarily positive, in that it seeks to characterize the policy outcomes that result from diﬀerent institutional structures of
budgeting. However, in order to provide a normative benchmark for the
analysis, this section derives the budget that would be chosen by a benevolent social planner. As the N districts are identical, social welfare is simply
the welfare of each district (as characterized in Equation (3)) multiplied by
11

The non-negativity constraints and the endowment constraint are never binding under
the assumptions made above, and are ignored in the analysis that follows.
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N . Thus, the social planner’s program is:
M ax N (ω − t + u(G) +

G,t,b1 ,...bK

X

mk hk (bk ))

(5)

k

subject to BC (i.e. Equation (4)). The Lagrangean is:
X
X
L = N (ω − t + u(G) +
mk hk (bk )) + λ(N t − G −
bk )
k

(6)

k

where λ is the Lagrangean multiplier. This leads straightforwardly to the
following characterization of the socially optimal budget:
Proposition 1 The socially optimal budget is {G∗ , b∗ }, where G∗ is defined
by:
1
(7)
u0 (G∗ ) =
N
and each b∗k is defined by:
h0k (b∗k ) =

1
N mk

The aggregate level of spending under the socially optimal budget is:
X
S ∗ = G∗ +
b∗k

(8)

(9)

k

Proof. The FOC w.r.t. t (−N + λN = 0)⇒ λ = 1 (so that BC is always
binding). The FOCs w.r.t. G and bk (respectively) are N u0 (G) = λ = 1
and N mk h0k (bk ) = λ = 1. Note that the SOCs are satisfied, as the Hessian
matrix is negative semidefinite everywhere by the assumptions made above.

Note that the socially optimal budget equates the marginal social benefits of the public good to the marginal social benefit from each of the
subsidies (i.e. u0 (G∗ ) = mk h0k (b∗k )∀k = 1, ..., K). Thus, in this model, the
subsidies have some social value, and hence they are provided in positive
amounts by the socially optimal budget.

3.3

The Institutional Features of the Legislature

This section outlines the assumptions about the legislature’s institutional
structure, and the payoﬀs of legislators. Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987) assume a relatively institution-free setting where the median voter theorem
11

applies (although they impose the restriction that voting is only on one dimension of the budget at a time). Here, it is assumed that committees in
Congress (exogenously) have some degree of agenda-setting power in their
area of jurisdiction. In particular, they have exclusive proposal power within
this sphere, and their proposals are voted on by the legislature under a closed
rule (i.e. without amendments being oﬀered).
The assumption of agenda-setting power, though not endogenized here,
can be motivated by any of a number of diﬀerent accounts of Congressional
institutions. For instance, Weingast and Marshall (1988) argue that committee power exists in order to facilitate an implicit process of logrolling among
legislators who prioritize diﬀerent areas. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) develop an informational theory of Congressional institutions, arguing that
the floor may cede some power to committees in order to obtain information that is of value to the floor as well as the committee. McKelvey and
Riezman (1992) suggest that junior legislators may be able to increase their
reelection probabilities by instituting a structure in which senior legislators
have disproportionate agenda-setting power.
The notion that committees have agenda setting power is also supported
by the available empirical evidence. For instance, Milyo (1997) studies the
impact of the introduction of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) budget
rules, which changed budgeting procedures in a way that empowered the
Budget Committee and reduced the discretion available to the Appropriations Committee. Milyo finds that GRH led to increased campaign contributions to members of the Budget Committee, and a reduction in the vote
share of members of the Appropriations Committee, suggesting that committees have jurisdictional property rights, and that they play an important
role in determining electoral and financial (and hence, presumably, policy)
outcomes.12
Turning to the motivations of legislators, recall that Equation (3) specifies the aggregate welfare of each district of the legislature. In the absence of
lobbying activity (which is discussed below), it is assumed that the legislator
representing district i maximizes that district’s aggregate welfare. That is,
the legislator’s payoﬀ is simply W . This behavior is not necessarily motivated by benevolence; rather, it can be induced by the desire to maximize
12

The notion of jurisdictional property rights is also widely accepted and used in the
public budgeting literature. Thurber (1997) argues that the CBA74 reforms reduced the
power of the Appropriations Committees, while Doyle and McCaﬀery (1992) claim that
the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 restored some of the power that GRH had removed
from the Appropriations Committees.
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the probability of reelection.13
The above assumption that legislators are perfect agents for their districts applies throughout the analysis below to the ‘junior legislators’ (i.e.
those who do not enjoy proposal power over budgetary decisionmaking).
This does not apply, however, to those legislators who are endowed with
agenda setting power. Recall that there are K sector-specific interest groups
in this political economy. It is assumed that each of these sectors is (exogenously) organized into a lobby group with the capacity to lobby the committee that has agenda-setting power over spending on their sector. When
such lobbying occurs, the legislators involved are assumed to maximize the
joint welfare of their district and the interest groups that engage in lobbying them. Thus, a legislator who is lobbied by all K organized groups will
maximize:
X
mk (ω − t + u(G) + hk (bk ))
(10)
W+
k

In eﬀect, these legislators place higher weights on the welfare of those who
belong to lobby groups. This can be motivated by the idea that the interest
groups can transfer political rents to the legislator (implicitly contingent on
policy choices).14
Maximization of the joint surplus entails that bargaining between the
legislator and the lobby groups (over policy and over these rents) is eﬃcient. However, no further structure is imposed on the lobbying process. It
would be possible to motivate this assumption using a common agency or
menu auction approach (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Dixit et al., 1997),
where each lobby group oﬀers the legislator a campaign contribution schedule contingent on the policy outcome, and the equilibrium is assumed to be
in ‘truthful’ strategies (where the contribution functions reflect the benefits
at the margin). However, for the purposes of this paper, it is unnecessary to
impose this or any other specific assumptions about the lobbying process.
The only requirement, as in Goldberg and Maggi (1999), is that bargaining
13
Persson et al. (1997; 2000) explicitly model the reelection incentive by allowing voters
to commit to a reelection rule, contingent on their level of utility and the legislator’s
choice of actions. Here, the focus is not primarily on the behavior of voters, but on that of
interest groups, and conflicts of interest among voters in diﬀerent districts are suppressed.
Also, while Persson et al. emphasize the rents that politicians can extract by diverting
part of government spending to themselves, the rents (if any) in this model are obtained
through (eﬃcient) bargaining with the interest groups.
14
Note that the objective function implicitly places the same extra weight (per capita)
on the welfare of each interest group. Later in the paper, the possibility of diﬀering weights
is introduced, when groups have a choice regarding the allocation of their lobbying eﬀort
across diﬀerent committees.
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between the legislator and the interest groups who lobby her is eﬃcient (as,
for instance, with Nash bargaining).
An important issue in the modeling of budgetary processes is what assumption to make about the default policy that is implemented if the policy
proposed by the legislator with agenda setting power is defeated on the floor
of the legislature. It is often assumed that, because funds must be appropriated by Congress before they can be spent, the natural reversion point
is zero spending.15 In practice, Congress usually passes a ‘continuing resolution’ to provide emergency funding when the appropriations process is
not completed by the required time. This paper makes the most general
assumption possible by allowing for an arbitrary default budget allocation
{GD , bD } (which implicitly defines a tax tD via the budget constraint). This
allocation is implemented whenever the agenda setter’s proposal is voted on
by the legislature and defeated. The advantage of this assumption is that
it encompasses the case of a zero default, but also permits consideration of
cases where the default outcome is more attractive (including that where
{GD , bD } = {G∗ , b∗ }).
The basic structure of the models that follow is that an agenda setter
proposes a budget, and all the legislators then vote for or against the proposal. The legislature’s decision is made by a simple majority voting rule
(with the default being implemented if the proposal fails). In such situations,
there are of course many voting equilibria. For example, let W P denote the
welfare of each district if the proposed budget is enacted and implemented,
and let W D be the welfare of each district if the default is implemented.
Then, even when W P > W D , it is an equilibrium for all junior legislators to
vote against the proposal (as each is nonpivotal, and deviating unilaterally
leads to a payoﬀ of W D , which is the same as the equilibrium payoﬀ). To
eliminate such equilibria, it is assumed that:
Assumption 3) Each junior legislator votes for the proposed budget iﬀ
W P ≥ W D ; otherwise, each votes against the proposed budget.
This can be motivated, for instance, by introducing an arbitrarily small
cost ε > 0 of voting against one’s district’s interest (a ‘position-taking’
motivation, as it is termed in the political science literature). Suppose this
small cost is incurred by a junior legislator who votes against the proposal
when W P ≥ W D . Then, it will be a dominant strategy for each junior
legislator j to vote for the proposal whenever W P ≥ W D . If j is nonpivotal,
15

This assumption is defended by Krehbiel (1998, p. 204), and is essentially that adopted
by Persson et al. (2000) (although they allow for the possibility that politicians receive
positive rents even when the budget proposal fails and no funds can be spent).
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voting yes doesn’t change the outcome, but leads to a gain of ε relative to
voting no. If j is pivotal, voting yes changes her payoﬀ from W D − ε to W P ,
which is higher by assumption.
It is assumed that the agenda setter always votes for her own proposal.
A further assumption that is maintained throughout the analysis is that,
ceteris paribus, the agenda setter prefers not to suﬀer defeat on the floor.
Thus, for example, if {GD , bD } = {G∗ , b∗ }, so that the agenda setter cannot
make a proposal that will defeat the default alternative, then she will propose
the default and win, rather than losing the vote (which of course gives the
same outcome). That is, for a given outcome, the agenda setter prefers to
propose that outcome and win, rather than to propose something else and
lose. This assumption can also be motivated by introducing a small cost of
losing a vote on the floor.16
Finally, it should be noted that many features of real-world Federal budgeting are omitted from the analysis, as they are not essential to convey the
insight of this paper. The role of the executive branch in the budget process
is ignored. The model assumes a unicameral legislature (emphasizing the
institutional features of the House rather than the Senate) with no political
parties. Revenue legislation and entitlement programs (essentially, the areas under the purview of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance
Committees) are also outside the scope of this paper. None of these omissions, however, fundamentally aﬀects the basic point that the paper seeks
to establish.

4

The Appropriations Process

The aim of this section is to develop and solve a model of the ‘appropriations
process’, a stylized version of budgeting in Congress prior to the reforms
associated with CBA74. The appropriations process in Congress is quite
complex.17 In the House, each of the thirteen Appropriations subcommittees
reports a bill appropriating funds in its area of jurisdiction, and each of these
bills is voted on (sequentially) by the full House. The model in this paper
abstracts from the internal workings of the Appropriations Committee, and
treats it as a unitary actor; thus, the model is extremely simple.18 The
treatment of the appropriations process per se is similar in this section and in
16

Note that this assumption entails that the bargaining between the agenda setter and
the lobby groups is over outcomes, not over proposals per se.
17
See e.g. Schick (1995, Ch. 8) and US Library of Congress (1997a).
18
The results would be essentially unchanged, however, if the model incorporated multiple Appropriations subcommittees.
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Section 5 below; however, there is no budget committee or budget resolution
here. Thus, this model is intended to capture the pre-1974 structure of
Congressional budgeting.
The Appropriations Committee (hereafter A) is assumed to have agenda
setting power over Congressional appropriations. Thus, it proposes a budget,
which is then voted on by the full legislature (hereafter L) under a closed
rule. If the proposal attracts majority support, it is implemented; otherwise,
the default budget is implemented. A’s payoﬀ (in the absence of lobbying)
would of course simply be W . However, A is lobbied by all the interest
groups representing the K organized sectors. Thus, in choosing its proposal,
A maximizes the sum of W and the welfare of the interest groups, subject
to two constraints. The first of these is BC (Equation (4)). The other
constraint is that the budget proposal attracts majority support on the
floor. This will be termed the ‘participation constraint’ (hereafter P), as it
involves ensuring that a suﬃcient number of junior legislators will choose to
participate in the coalition that enacts the budget.
The timing of the game (as illustrated by Figure 1) is as follows:
1) A proposes a budget {GP , bP }, lobbied by all the organized interest
groups representing sectors k = 1, ..., K
2) The legislature votes on the proposal by majority voting under a
closed rule (with no amendments being permitted). If the proposal passes,
{GP , bP } is implemented; if it does not pass, the default budget {GD , bD }
is implemented
This game can be solved for the subgame-perfect equilibrium using backwards induction. However, the final stage of the game, where each junior
legislator votes for the proposal iﬀ W P ≥ W D (see Assumption 3 above),
is quite trivial. Thus, an equivalent approach to solving this game is to
simply incorporate the junior legislators’ participation constraint (P) into
A’s program. Given that A is lobbied by the interest groups, its payoﬀ can
be expressed as:
X
mk (ω − t + u(G) + hk (bk ))
(11)
W+
k

WD

(the welfare of each district if the default budget is implemented) is:
X
W D = ω − t + u(GD ) +
mk hk (bD
(12)
k )
k

Thus, P can be written as:

ω − t + u(G) +

X
k
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mk hk (bk ) ≥ W D

(13)

Using λ (as before) for the Lagrangean multiplier of BC, and µ for the
multiplier of P, A’s problem is to maximize:
X
X
mk hk (bk ) + λ[N t − G −
bk ]
L = (1 + mI )(ω − t + u(G)) + 2
+µ[ω − t + u(G) +

X
k

k

k

D

mk hk (bk ) − W ]

(14)

As in the social planner’s problem, BC is always binding. However, P may
or may not be binding. Let {GA , bA } denote A’s optimal choice of budget
proposal (and tA the associated tax), ignoring P. Then, P is binding iﬀ:
X
D
ω − t + u(GA ) +
mk hk (bA
(15)
k)<W
k

Otherwise, P is not binding (i.e. the LHS above is ≥ W D ). Whether P is
binding or not depends, intuitively, on how attractive the default budget is
to the junior legislators. As the default is exogenous, all possible default
budgets need to be considered; the analysis here will consider both the case
where P binds and the case where it does not bind. The equilibrium outcome
can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2 The (unique) subgame perfect equilibrium outcome under
the appropriations process is:
(a) A proposes {G∗ , b0 }, where G∗ is defined as in Proposition 1, and
b0k is defined by
1 + mI + µ
h0k (b0k ) =
(16)
(2 + µ)N mk
If the default budget is such that P does not bind, then µ = 0 and b0k =
∗
bA
k > bk ∀k. If the default budget is such that P binds, then µ > 0 and
0
∗
D = W∗
b∗k ≤ b0k < bA
k ∀k; bk = bk only if W
(b) the proposal is passed unanimously and implementedP
∗
Note that the aggregate levelPof spending is S A = G∗ + k bA
k > S if P
0
∗
0
∗
0
is not binding, and S = G + k bk if P is binding, where S ≤ S < S A ;
S 0 = S ∗ only if W D = W ∗
Proof. The FOCs for A’s program (noting that λ = (1 + mI + µ)/N ) are:
u0 (G) =

1
λ
=
1 + mI + µ
N
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(17)

as in Proposition 1 (regardless of the value of µ), and
h0k (bk ) =

1 + mI + µ
Nmk (2 + µ)

(18)

When P is not binding, so that µ = 0, this characterizes bA
k . Moreover, as
0 (b∗ ) ⇒ bA > b∗ (by Assumption 2). This trivially
)
<
h
1 + mI < 2, h0k (bA
k
k k
k
k
implies that S A > S ∗ .
Note that the derivative of h0k (bk ) w.r.t. µ is strictly positive. Thus, when
A
0
P is binding, so that µ > 0, h0k (b0k ) > h0k (bA
k ) ⇒ bk > bk (by Assumption 2).
When W D < W ∗ , A sets
X
mk hk (b0k ) = W D < W ∗
(19)
ω − t + u(G∗ ) +
k

in equilibrium. Thus, at least one k receives b0k > b∗k ; for that k, h0k (bk ) is
given by the expression above. In equilibrium, h0k (bk ) = h0i (bi ) for i 6= k; i.e.
1 + mI + µ
1
1 + mI + µ
=
<
N mk (2 + µ)
N mi (2 + µ)
N mi

(20)

This is true ∀i; thus, b0i > b∗i ∀i. It follows trivially that S ∗ ≤ S 0 < S A and
S 0 = S ∗ only if W D = W ∗ . Note that the uniqueness of the outcome (for a
given default and set of parameter values) follows from the use of BI.
Thus, the appropriations process leads to overspending, relative to the
social optimum. However, the public good is provided at the socially optimal
level; given its nationwide character, the interest groups have no incentive
to distort its provision.19 Consequently, overspending is due entirely to the
subsidies, which are overprovided because the beneficiaries have extra weight
in A’s objective function due to their lobbying activity. The extent of overspending is greater when the default budget is less attractive to the junior
legislators (so that P is nonbinding). When P is binding, A satisfies the constraint by holding G∗ fixed (as changing it would reduce junior legislators’
utility, and make it even more diﬃcult to attract votes for the proposal),
while reducing the overspending on subsidies. However, overspending is
completely eliminated only if the default happens to be the socially optimal
budget.
19
If voter welfare were not separable in G and private consumption, then the appropriations process may not lead to the socially optimal G∗ . However, it will in general still
be the case that the G chosen under the appropriations process is closer to G∗ than that
chosen under the budget process.
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5

The Budget Process

The 1974 reforms to Congressional budgeting procedures created the Budget
Committees of the House and Senate, and established the budget process
that (supplemented later by budget rules intended to control the deficit) is
essentially still in place today. The primary task of the Budget Committees
is to formulate and report the ‘budget resolution’, which sets a target for the
aggregate level of spending, and broad functional allocations of that spending across budget areas. It is not a law, but rather a concurrent resolution,
adopted by Congress and not presented to the President for signature or
veto. Nonetheless, observers of Congressional budgeting generally express
the view that the budget resolution has an impact on the subsequent stages
of the budget process (see, for instance, Schick (1995, Ch. 5) and Garrett
(2000, p. 714)).
This section introduces a Budget Committee (hereafter, B) into the
model. As in the real-world budget process, B and the budget resolution
are superimposed on the existing appropriations process. Prior to A’s budget proposal, B proposes a budget resolution specifying an aggregate level
of spending S P ∈ <+ ; then, the legislature L votes on whether or not to
adopt the budget resolution (it is assumed that, as with voting on the budget itself, junior legislators vote for the resolution if they are indiﬀerent).
If it is not adopted, the appropriations process proceeds (as in Section 4)
with no budget resolution.20 If it is adopted, B’s proposal becomes the budget resolution, denoted S BR . Then, A proposes a budget (as in Section 4),
but now subject to what will be termed the ‘budget resolution constraint’
(BRC) that total spending is no greater than S BR , in addition to the other
constraints in Section 4.
In this section, it is taken as exogenously given that the budget resolution
(if adopted) is binding on A. In Section 6, the enforcement of the budget
resolution is endogenized by incorporating the relevant procedural rules into
the analysis, along with another aspect of the budget process that is ignored
here, namely, reconciliation. The functional allocations that also form part
of the budget resolution are not modeled here; the resolution is taken as
setting only an aggregate level of spending. The more specific program
allocations recommended by B are also ignored, as (unlike the aggregate
20

The justification for this assumption is the following. In the House, a point of order prevents the consideration of spending bills until after a budget resolution has been
adopted. However, this point of order does not apply to appropriations bills after May 15
(Thurber, 1997, p. 68; US Library of Congress, 1998a; 1999). Thus, appropriations bills
can proceed after that date even in the absence of a budget resolution.
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spending target) they are not viewed by observers as being binding on A
(e.g. Garrett, 2000, p. 717). B’s task is thus simply to specify an aggregate
budget size, with jurisdiction over the division of the budget remaining with
A.21 As Schick (1995, p. 73) explains:
The budget resolution does not allocate funds to specific programs or accounts: any attempt to do so would run foul of the
jurisdictions of the appropriations committees, which vigilantly
guard their control of line items. . .
It is this division of budgetary authority that is crucial to the main result
of this section. Before proceeding to develop this idea, however, the analysis
begins by deriving a set of circumstances in which the two institutional
structures lead to the same policy outcome. Then, a more general model is
presented, and the central result derived.

5.1

A Neutrality Result

This section establishes a set of conditions under which the budget process
leads to the same policy outcome as does the appropriations process. This
neutrality result is not intended as a realistic claim about Congressional
budgeting, but rather helps to clarify the conditions under which the institutional structure does matter. The basic assumption here is that the
interest groups face no constraints on the resources they can devote to lobbying; thus, each group can freely lobby both A and B.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1) B proposes S P ∈ <+ , lobbied by all the interest groups
2) L votes on S P . If it passes, S BR = S P and is binding on A; otherwise,
no budget resolution is adopted (in eﬀect, S BR = ∞)
3) A proposes a budget {GP , bP }, lobbied by all the interest groups. If
L adopted S P , A is subject (in addition to BC) to BRC:
X
GP +
bPk ≤ S BR
(21)
k

4) L votes on the proposed budget under a closed rule. If it passes,
{GP , bP } is implemented; if it does not pass, the default budget {GD , bD }
is implemented
21

“The budget resolution was designed to provide a framework to make budget decisions,
leaving specific program determinations to appropriations committees . . .” (US Library
of Congress, 1996, p. 3).
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As before, this game can be solved by backwards induction. Again, it
proves convenient to incorporate the voting choices of the junior legislators
into A’s program in stage 3, and into B’s program in stage 1 (the participation constraints faced by A and B, respectively, will now be denoted by PA
and PB ). Let ρ be the multiplier for the new constraint (BRC) faced by A.
Then, the Lagrangean for A’s program can be expressed as:
X
X
mk hk (bk ) + λ[N t − G −
bk ]
L = (1 + mI )(ω − t + u(G)) + 2
+µ[ω − t + u(G) +

+ρ[S BR − G −

X

X
k

k

k

D

mk hk (bk ) − W ]

bk ]

(22)

k

The solution to this program implicitly defines A’s best response functions
BR ), t+ (S BR ). B’s program is:
G+ (S BR ), b+
k (S
X
BR
M ax(1 + mI )(ω − t+ (S BR ) + u(G+ (S BR ))) + 2
mk hk (b+
)) (23)
k (S
S BR

k

subject to PB , which can be expressed as:
X
X
A
BR
mk hk (b+
)) ≥ ω−tA +u(G∗ ))+
mk hk (bk )
ω−t+ (S BR )+u(G+ (S BR ))+
k (S
k

k

(24)

if PA is not binding, or as:
X
X
0
BR
mk hk (b+
)) ≥ ω−t0 +u(G∗ ))+
mk hk (bk )
ω−t+ (S BR )+u(G+ (S BR ))+
k (S
k

if PA is binding (where
The result is:

0 A
bA
k , bk , t

k

and

t0

(25)
are as defined in Proposition 2).

Proposition 3 If all interest groups can freely lobby both A and B, then the
budget under the budget process is identical to that under the appropriations
process. In particular, the equilibrium outcome of the budget process is:
a) B proposes any S P ≥ S A (if PA is not binding) or any S P ≥ S 0 (if
PA is binding)
b) the proposal is enacted; S BR = S P
c) if PA is not binding, A proposes {G∗ , bA }; if PA is binding, A proposes
{G∗ , b0 }
21

d) the proposed budget is passed unanimously
where G∗ , bA , b0 , S A and S 0 are defined as in Proposition 2
Proof. Consider the FOCs for A’s program. Noting that λ = (1 + mI +
µ)/N , A’s budget is defined by:
u0 (G) =

1 + mI + µ + Nρ
N (1 + mI + µ)

(26)

h0k (bk ) =

1 + mI + µ + N ρ
Nmk (2 + µ)

(27)

and

B has the same objective function as A (being lobbied by the same set of
groups). Thus, B’s preferred budget is {G∗ , bA } (if PA is not binding) or
{G∗ , b0 } (if PA is binding). B can ensure that this budget is chosen by A by
setting S P ≥ S A or S P ≥ S 0 (respectively), and hence setting ρ = 0. Each
junior legislator is indiﬀerent between adopting the budget resolution and not
doing so (as the resolution has no eﬀect on the outcome), so by assumption
each votes for S P . The other results simply follow those in Proposition 2.

This result shows that merely imposing a budget resolution on the appropriations process will not change budgetary outcomes if B and A share
the same objectives. Rather, some conflict of interest between the two decisionmakers is essential if one is to constrain the other’s tendency towards
overspending. The next section generates such a divergence in objectives by
endogenizing the choice of lobbying eﬀort by interest groups.

5.2

A More General Model

This section generalizes the formulation of the budget process presented
above, by introducing a resource constraint for the lobby groups, and allowing them to choose their allocation of lobbying eﬀort between the two
committees.22 In the models in the previous sections, a legislator who is
lobbied places equal weight on the welfare of her district and the welfare of
the groups that lobby her. In this section, this formulation is generalized by
allowing the weight placed on each group’s welfare to depend on its lobbying
eﬀort. Admittedly, this remains a somewhat reduced-form representation of
22

They could also be allowed to lobby any of the junior legislators without fundamentally altering the results (as only A and B have agenda setting power). However, this
formulation would add greatly to the complexity of the analysis.
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the lobbying process; however, it has the advantage of considerable generality, being consistent with a number of diﬀerent approaches to the analysis
of lobbying.23
Let yk be the total resources available to group k to engage in lobbying,
and assume that yk is measured in units of ‘weight’ placed on group k’s
welfare by a legislator who is lobbied by that group. Note that the model
in Section 4 was simply a special case of this, where yk = 1∀k; the outcome
under the appropriations process given this new assumption is an extremely
straightforward generalization of the results in Section 4. Let γ k ∈ [0, 1] be
the fraction of group k’s lobbying resources devoted to lobbying A; thus, A’s
objective function places weight γ k yk on group k’s welfare.
The game in this section begins with each group (noncooperatively)
choosing its allocation of lobbying resources between A and B. Given that
lobbying is productive at the margin, the resource constraint will always be
binding, so this decision simply amounts to a choice of γ k . The timing of
the game is as follows (see Figure 2):
1) Each interest group k = 1, ..., K noncooperatively chooses its γ k
2) B proposes S P ∈ <+ , under the influence of those interest groups
that choose to lobby B
3) L votes on S P . If it passes, S BR = S P and is binding on A; otherwise,
no budget resolution is adopted (in eﬀect, S BR = ∞)
4) A proposes a budget {GP , bP }, under the influence of those interest
groups that choose to lobby A. If L adopted S P , A is subject (in addition
to BC) to BRC
5) L votes on the proposed budget under a closed rule. If it passes,
{GP , bP } is implemented; if it does not pass, the default budget {GD , bD }
is implemented
As before, this can be solved by backwards induction. Combining stages
4 and 5, A’s program is:
X
X
γ k yk )(ω − t + u(G)) +
(1 + γ k yk )mk hk (bk )
(28)
M ax(1 +
G,t,b

k

k

subject to the same constraints as before: BC, PA , and BRC. The solution
to this program, ignoring BRC (i.e. setting ρ = 0), yields the outcome under
the appropriations process (closely analogous to the outcome in Section 4).
Let {GAγ , bAγ } denote the budget proposed by A (subject to BC and PA )
23
For instance, the weights could represent the credibility of promises made by the
group in bargaining (with credibility being costly to establish), or they could represent
the degree of access gained to the legislator.
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and enacted by L under the appropriations process, and let tAγ and S Aγ
be the associated tax and level of aggregate spending, respectively. The
corresponding choices under the budget process with a binding BRC (i.e.
ρ > 0) will be denoted {GB , bB }, tB , and S B (these can be expressed as
(best response) functions of the budget resolution S BR , like the G+ (S BR )
and related functions in the previous section).
Combining stages 2 and 3, B’s program can be expressed as:
X
X
BR
))
M ax(1+ (1−γ k )yk )(ω−tB (S BR )+u(GB (S BR )))+ (1+(1−γ k )yk )mk hk (bB
k (S
S BR

k

k

(29)

subject to PB , which, in this context, can be expressed as:
X
X
Aγ
BR
mk hk (bB
)) ≥ ω−tAγ +u(GAγ ))+
mk hk (bk )
ω−tB (S BR )+u(GB (S BR ))+
k (S
k

k

(30)

Finally, given B’s optimal choice of budget resolution, denoted S BR∗ , each
interest group chooses γ k to:
BR∗
M axmk (ω−tB (S BR∗ (γ k ); γ k )+u(GB (S BR∗ (γ k ); γ k ))+hk (bB
(γ k ); γ k )))
k (S
γk

(31)
The equilibrium outcome can be characterized as follows:
Proposition 4 Suppose that the number of interest groups K is suﬃciently
large. Then, when {GD , bD } 6= {G∗ , b∗ }, the (unique) subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is:
1) Each interest group k = 1, ..., K sets γ k = 1
2) B proposes S P < S Aγ
3) B’s proposal is enacted; S BR = S P
4) A proposes a budget {GB , bB }, entailing aggregate spending S B =
Aγ
BR
S , where GB < G∗ and bB
k < bk ∀k.
5) A’s proposal is adopted unanimously, and is implemented
When {GD , bD } = {G∗ , b∗ }, the outcome diﬀers as follows:
2) B proposes any S P ≥ S ∗
4) A proposes {G∗ , b∗ }
Proof. To solve the finalPtwo stages, consider the FOCs for A’s problem,
noting that λ = (1 + µ + k γ k yk mk )/N:
P
1 + µ + k γ k yk mk + N ρ
P
u0 (G) =
(32)
N (1 + µ + k γ k yk mk )
24

and
h0k (bk )

P
1 + µ + k γ k yk mk + N ρ
=
N mk (1 + µ + γ k yk )

(33)

Stages 2 and 3 involve B choosing S BR subject to PB (Eq. (29)). Anticipating this choice of S BR , the interest groups choose their γ k ’s in stage 1.
Consider any choice of γ k ∈ [0, 1) by group k. Suppose that k deviates from
this choice with a small increase in γ k (i.e. a small reallocation of lobbying
eﬀort from B to A) to (γ k + ), for arbitrarily small > 0, taking as given the
choices of other groups (the γ j ’s (j 6= k)). From the FOCs for A’s problem
above, a small increase in γ k leads to a fall in h0k (bk ), and hence to a rise
in bk (i.e. group k can raise its subsidy by reallocating lobbying eﬀort from
B to A).
While the equilibrium P
bk depends directly on γ k , the equilibrium G depends on γ k only through k γ k yk mk . For large K, this sum is determined
almost entirely by the γ j ’s (which are held constant by assumption), and
can be assumed to be approximately constant when γ k changes by a small
amount. Thus, G can be assumed to be approximately fixed (even when this
approximation is not valid, from the FOCs for A’s problem above, a small
increase in γ k leads to a rise in G).
Now consider B’s response to a small increase in γ k .PB’s problem, and
hence the optimal S BR , depend
k (1 − γ k )yk (ω −
P on γ k through the sumsB BR
B
BR
B
BR
t (S ) + u(G (S )) and k (1 + (1 − γ k )yk )mk hk (bk (S )). As argued
above, these sums can be assumed to be approximately constant when γ k
changes by a small amount, and hence, so can S BR . Even when this approximation is not valid, similar results will hold as long as the fall in S BR
in response to an increase in γ k is suﬃciently small. As B does not have
the power to determine bk , any decline in S BR would be spread over all bj ’s
(and G). For group k’s benefits from a higher bk to be oﬀset by a reduced
S BR , the fall in S BR would have to be much larger (by a factor related to
K) than the rise in bk .
The reasoning above implies that it is profitable for k to deviate from γ k
to (γ k + ) (and thereby raise bk while S BR stays approximately fixed; note
that, with approximately constant S BR , the rise in bk involves A reallocating
budgetary resources from other groups to bk ). This is true for all γ k ∈ [0, 1),
and, moreover, for all groups k. Thus, when K is suﬃciently large that the
approximations above are valid, it is a dominant strategy for each group to
set γ k = 1.
To show that S BR < S Aγ when {GD , bD } 6= {G∗ , b∗ }, note that, as γ k =
1∀k, B’s objective function is simply UB = W , and hence coincides with
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social welfare (note also that, as a consequence, PB can never be binding).
Setting S BR = S Aγ (and hence ρ = 0 in the equations above) implies that
the budget will be {G∗ , bAγ }, where bAγ
> b∗k . Reducing S BR by a small
k
amount will make ρ > 0 and cause both G and the bk ’s to fall. At G∗ ,
∂UB
∂G = 0, so a small decrease in G has no eﬀect on B’s utility. However, at
∂UB
bAγ
k , ∂bk < 0∀k; thus, a small decrease in bk increases B’s utility. Hence,
B will find it optimal to set S BR < S Aγ .
As S BR < S Aγ , it follows that ρ > 0. Thus, from the equations above,
Aγ
BR is enacted because each
GB < G∗ and bB
k < bk ∀k. The proposed S
Aγ
junior legislator prefers spending less than S
(note that A may not vote
for the budget resolution; however, this will not aﬀect the voting outcome).
A’s proposed budget is enacted, as it satisfies PA .
The results when {GD , bD } = {G∗ , b∗ } follow straightforwardly, recalling the assumption that A prefers to propose {G∗ , b∗ } rather than face defeat
on the floor.
Thus, when the number of groups is large, each chooses to focus all its
lobbying eﬀort on A. The basic intuition is that no group can individually
influence B’s choice of budget resolution substantially, whereas (for a given
budget resolution) each group can increase its subsidy by lobbying A. When
K is not suﬃciently large, the equilibrium may involve the interest groups allocating some of their lobbying eﬀort to B. However, B will, in general, still
constrain A’s spending (relative to the situation under the appropriations
process).
It should be noted that one eﬀect of the introduction of the budget
process is to create an additional layer of legislative decisionmaking, and
hence another committee that the interest groups must lobby to obtain
their preferred policies. Nonetheless, it is not the extra resources required
to lobby B, but the free rider problem among groups, that primarily drives
the result above. In particular, even if the groups’ resource endowments were
increased to compensate for the need to lobby an additional committee, the
free rider problem would remain, so that these extra resources would be
allocated to lobbying A rather than B.
Note that the provision of the national public good is suboptimal under
the budget process, whereas it is optimal under the appropriations process.
Essentially, under the appropriations process, A was faced with a participation constraint (i.e. securing majority support for the budget proposal).
Reducing G below its optimal level would only make this constraint more
diﬃcult to satisfy. Under the budget process, the BRC is framed solely in
terms of the amount of aggregate spending, rather than in terms of welfare.
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Thus, it is possible to satisfy the BRC by reducing either G, the bk ’s, or
both. As A is lobbied by the interest groups, A prefers a diﬀerent mix of
spending on G and on the bk ’s than is socially optimal. Thus, A will, in
general, choose to reduce both G and the subsidies. Consequently, there is
a tradeoﬀ for social welfare between the loss from the reduction of G and
the gains from the reduction of the bk ’s.
The primary aim of this paper is to compare levels of aggregate spending and social welfare under each of the two institutional structures. Let
S AP and S BP be the levels of aggregate spending under the appropriations
process and the budget process, respectively, and let W AP and W BP be
social welfare under each regime. Using the equilibrium outcome derived
above, it is possible to conclude that:
Proposition 5 If the number of interest groups K is suﬃciently large, then:
1) S BP ≤ S AP ; if {GD , bD } 6= {G∗ , b∗ }, then S BP < S AP
2) W BP ≥ W AP ; if {GD , bD } 6= {G∗ , b∗ }, then W BP > W AP
Proof. 1) Using the earlier notation above, S AP = S Aγ and S BP = S BR
when {GD , bD } 6= {G∗ , b∗ }. By Proposition 4 above, S BR < S Aγ . If
{GD , bD } = {G∗ , b∗ }, then S AP = S BP = S ∗
2) Note that W AP is social welfare given the budget {GAγ , bAγ }. W AP
is thus B’s payoﬀ in the absence of a (binding) budget resolution.
Suppose that {GD , bD } 6= {G∗ , b∗ }. By the argument in the proof of
Proposition 4 above, it is always possible for B to strictly raise her payoﬀ
UB by setting S BR < S Aγ , so that UB > W AP . But, as B’s objective
function is equivalent to social welfare (given that no interest groups lobby
B), UB = W BP ; i.e. W BP > W AP .
If {GD , bD } = {G∗ , b∗ }, then W BP = W AP = W ∗
Thus, aggregate spending is always lower, and social welfare higher, under the budget process (except in the extreme case where the default is
the socially optimal budget). The welfare result follows from B’s payoﬀ
being equivalent to social welfare, and entails that the welfare loss from
the suboptimal level of G is outweighed by the welfare gains from curbing
overspending on the bk ’s. The fact that A retains decision rights over the
allocation of the budget may seem to limit the scope for increasing social
welfare through the budget resolution. However, it should be emphasized
that the division of powers between A and B is crucial. If B were given
more powers (e.g. to determine the composition of the budget as well as
its size), then the interest groups would switch their lobbying activity to B,
thus reproducing the outcome under the appropriations process (Section 4),
and lowering social welfare.
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6

Endogenizing the Enforcement of the Budget
Resolution

In the previous section, it was assumed that the budget resolution is binding
on A. In this section, the enforcement of the budget resolution is explicitly
modeled and endogenized. In practice, two kinds of mechanisms are used
in Congress to enforce the budget resolution. Title III of CBA74 provides
that points of order may be raised on the floor to prevent consideration of
proposed legislation that violates the substantive provisions of the budget
resolution (US Library of Congress, 1998a). Any member may raise such
a point of order, and “when a point of order is sustained, the violating
bill or amendment is not considered” (p. 1). The aggregate spending level
specified in the budget resolution is enforced in this way under Section 311(a)
of CBA74. However, these points of order may be waived in the House
through a special rule reported by the Rules Committee.24
The other mechanism for enforcement is the budget reconciliation process
(Schick, 1995, pp. 82f; US Library of Congress, 1998b; 1999). The Budget Committee may, as part of the budget resolution, include instructions
to committees overseeing spending or revenue legislation, directing them to
recommend legislation that conforms to the levels of spending and revenue
specified in the budget resolution. The recommendations of the committees
that are so directed are then incorporated by the Budget Committee into a
reconciliation bill (or, if there are recomendations from multiple committees,
into an omnibus reconciliation bill) that is voted on by Congress. It should
be noted that reconciliation instructions are not issued directly to the Appropriations Committee; however, spending bills may be aﬀected indirectly
through instructions issued to other committees overseeing spending programs (Schick, 1995, p. 83). In theory, CBA74 does not permit the Budget
Committee to make ‘substantive revisions’ to the recommendations made
by the committees to whom reconciliation instructions are directed (US Library of Congress, 1998b). However, in practice: “Sometimes the budget
committees . . . develop alternatives to the committee recommendations,
which are then oﬀered as floor amendments” (Schick, 1995, p. 85).
The model here generalizes that of the previous section by relaxing the
assumption that A’s strategy set is restricted to budget proposals that satisfy
the BRC. In addition, it incorporates elements of both substantive points
of order and the reconciliation process, in as parsimonious a manner as
24

See US Library of Congress (1997b) for a detailed description of the use of points of
order in the Congressional budget process.
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possible. It also introduces the Rules Committee (hereafter, R) into the
analysis. Its role here is simply to decide whether or not to waive points of
order when A proposes a budget that violates the aggregate spending level
specified in the budget resolution.25 Each interest group k can now allocate
its total lobbying resources yk among A, B and R; the fraction allocated to
A is denoted (as above) by γ k , while the fraction assigned to R is denoted
by φk .
The timing is as follows (as illustrated in Figure 3):26
1) Each interest group k = 1, ..., K noncooperatively chooses γ k and φk ,
subject to γ k + φk ≤ 1
2) B proposes S P ∈ <+ , under the influence of those interest groups
that choose to lobby B
3) L votes on S P . If L does not enact S P , then A proposes a budget
{GP , bP }, under the influence of those interest groups that choose to lobby
A, and L votes on this. If it passes, {GP , bP } is implemented; if it does not
pass, the default budget {GD , bD } is implemented
4) If L enacts S P , then S BR = S P . A proposes a budget {GP , bP },
under the influence of those interest groups that choose to lobby A (but not
necessarily subject to BRC)
5) If {GP , bP } satisfies S BR , L votes on the proposed budget. If it
passes, {GP , bP } is implemented; if it does not pass, the default budget
{GD , bD } is implemented
6) If {GP , bP } does not satisfy S BR , R decides whether or not to waive
points of order, under the influence of those interest groups that choose to
lobby R
7) If R waives points of order, L votes on the proposed budget. If it
passes, {GP , bP } is implemented; if it does not pass, the default budget
{GD , bD } is implemented
8) If R does not waive points of order, each junior legislator j decides
whether to (costlessly) raise a point of order against {GP , bP }
25

In practice, such a waiver must be passed by the full House; however, it is reported
by R, and the assumption here is that R enjoys some degree of deference from the floor
on such procedural matters.
26
CBA74 originally envisaged two budget resolutions, one at the beginning and the
other towards the end of the budget process (including reconciliation instructions). The
requirement for a second resolution was repealed in 1985 (Davis, 1997, p. 17). Thus,
reconciliation instructions are issued at the beginning of the process, as part of the budget
resolution. The model here appears to place reconciliation at the end of the game, but
this is not crucial to the results; it could be imagined, for instance, that the instructions
are issued as part of the resolution, contingent on the game reaching stage 10, and on the
history of play up to that point.
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9) If no j raises a point of order, L votes on the proposed budget. If
it passes, {GP , bP } is implemented; if it does not pass, the default budget
{GD , bD } is implemented
10) If at least one j raises a point of order, it is sustained, and {GP , bP }
is not voted on. Instead, B proposes a reconciliation bill {GP , bP }0 . In doing
so, B can reduce (but not increase) each element of {GP , bP } in order to
make it conform (exactly) to S BR
11) L votes on {GP , bP }0 . If it passes, {GP , bP }0 is implemented; if it
does not pass, the default budget {GD , bD } is implemented
It should be emphasized that B does not have complete discretion over
the budget proposal in stage 10; rather, B can only make limited (downward) adjustments that result in a budget that (just) conforms to the budget
resolution.27 The game, though somewhat more complicated than before,
can again be solved using backwards induction. The main diﬀerence here
is that A can now choose whether to satisfy BRC, or to satisfy what will
be termed R’s ‘points of order waiver constraint’ (PWC) that the proposed
budget gives R suﬃcient utility that it waives points of order. A’s objective
function, and the constraints PA , BC and BRC are exactly as in the previous
section. PWC can be expressed as:
X
ω + u(G) − t + (1 +
φk yk mk )hk (bk ) ≥ UR ({GP , bP }0 )
(34)
k

where UR ({GP , bP }0 ) is R’s payoﬀ from the budget reconciliation bill. Of
course, this depends on B’s strategic choice. However, at the time that A
proposes {GP , bP }, S BR is known, and B’s optimal choice of {GP , bP }0 to
maximize its welfare given S BR can be anticipated. Thus, UR ({GP , bP }0 )
can be taken as given at that point. The multiplier of PWC will be denoted
µR below.
The result is:
Proposition 6 Suppose that K is suﬃciently large, and that {GD , bD } 6=
{G∗ , b∗ }. Then, the (unique) subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is:
1) Each interest group k = 1, ..., K sets γ k = 1 (and hence φk = 0)
2) B proposes the same S P as in Proposition 4
3) L votes to enact B’s proposal; S BR = S P
27

Hence, this power does not amount to an ‘ex post veto’ of the type discussed by
Shepsle and Weingast (1987). They argue that, in a bicameral legislature, committee
power is based on the control of membership on conference committees that confer with
the other chamber to reconcile diﬀerences when each chamber has passed a bill in diﬀerent
versions.
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4) A proposes the same budget {GP , bP } as in Proposition 4, choosing
the level of aggregate spending specified in the budget resolution
5) L votes for {GP , bP }, which is implemented
Note that, oﬀ the equilibrium path, if A proposes a budget that violates
the budget resolution, R does not waive points of order, each junior legislator
j raises a point of order, B proposes a reconciliation bill {GP , bP }0 , and L
votes for {GP , bP }0 , which is implemented.
Proof. Consider the FOCs for A’s problem:
P
1 + µ + µR + k γ k yk mk + N ρ
P
(35)
u0 (G) =
N (1 + µ + µR + k γ k yk mk )
and

h0k (bk )

P
1 + µ + µR + k γ k yk mk + Nρ
=
N mk (1 + µ + µR + γ k yk + µR φk yk )

(36)

Note that, as A need not satisfy both BRC and PWC, at least one of ρ
and µR is zero. Suppose µR = 0. Then, the argument from the proof of
Proposition 4 holds - for large K, each group k can take ρ as approximately
fixed. Thus, setting γ k = 1 is a dominant strategy. Suppose ρ = 0. By an
analogous argument to that in the proof of Proposition 4, each k can take µR
as approximately fixed. Thus, setting γ k = 1 is again a dominant strategy.
Hence, B and R have identical objective functions (i.e. W ). A thus
faces a choice between satisfying BRC (which leads to A’s optimal budget,
given S BR ), and failing to satisfy BRC. If A chooses the latter, B’s reconciliation bill (which maximizes W given S BR and the restriction that no
item be increased) will be preferred by R and each j to A’s proposal (as B, R
and j all have the common payoﬀ function W ). Thus, R will not waive
points of order, each j will raise a point of order, and B’s proposal will be
enacted. Clearly, this is worse for A than its own proposal, given S BR (i.e.
UA ({GP , bP }) > UA ({GP , bP }0 )).
Consequently, A will always choose to satisfy BRC. Thus, µR = 0, and
the FOCs reduce to those in the proof of Proposition 4. Thus, the solutions
are identical to those in Proposition 4.
Thus, this more general game leads to exactly the same pattern of equilibrium behavior as does the game in the previous section. What is significant here is that A endogenously chooses to satisfy BRC. Intuitively, the
story is very similar to that of the previous model. The interest groups can
choose to divide their lobbying eﬀorts among A, B and R. Lobbying R,
like lobbying B, represents the provision of a public good for all the interest
groups. Essentially, it induces R to permit a budget proposal that violates
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the budget resolution to come to the floor under a special rule. Any single
group captures only a small fraction of the benefits of the waiver of points
of order. Thus, when K is large, no group lobbies R. Hence, if A proposes a
budget that does not conform to the budget resolution, it will have a point
of order raised against it, and will not be voted on. The result will be that
B’s reconciliation bill will be passed, and this is clearly worse from A’s viewpoint than is its own choice of budget, subject to BRC. Thus, A will always
satisfy BRC.
An important point to note here is that, in this game (as in the real-world
Congress), B’s power to shape specific budget allocations is strictly limited.
If B were able to essentially choose its own preferred budget allocation
through a reconciliation bill in stage 10, then it would be possible to enact
a budget resolution (say, 0) that A could not possibly satisfy, thus giving
B complete control of budgetary policy through the reconciliation process.
However, if B had this power, each interest group would choose to lobby it,
leading to the same outcome as under the appropriations process. Thus, as
stressed earlier, a delicate balance of power between A and B (and also R)
is crucial to the operation of the Congressional budget process.28

7

The Impact of Statutory Budget Rules

The preceding section closes this paper’s analysis of the logic of the Congressional budget process per se. However, there is a closely related feature of
Congressional budgeting which the basic insight above may also illuminate.
As was discussed earlier, the large deficits that had emerged by the early
1980’s led to the budget process created by CBA74 being supplemented by
a number of budget rules. Notable among these were the GRH provisions
enacted through the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act
of 1985, and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA90). The latter
was renewed through the Budget Enforcement Act of 1997, and is currently
still in force. BEA90 established discretionary spending limits, defined as
“statutory caps on the level of budget authority and outlays determined
through the annual appropriations process” (US Library of Congress, 2001,
p. 1) that operate in addition to the budget resolution. The limits are enforced through automatic sequestration: “the across-the-board cancellation
28

Thurber (1997) argues that CBA74 reduced the power of the Appropriations Committees. While this is clearly true, the analysis in this paper suggests that the success
of the budget process depends on the Appropriations Committees retaining a significant
amount of power over specific allocations to programs; otherwise, lobbyists would focus
on B, reproducing the Section 4 outcome.
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of budgetary resources in nonexempt programs” (US Library of Congress,
2001, p. 2).29
A notable feature of these budget rules is their purely statutory nature.
In particular, they can be revised or overturned by a simple majority vote.30
Auerbach (1994), Gramlich (1995) and others have pointed out that these
statutory budget rules pose a puzzle. As Auerbach (1994, p. 155) explains:
“Presumably, budget rules are imposed by legislators . . . to force themselves to accept more fiscal austerity than they would agree to in the normal
course of events.” However, if there is a majority in the legislature for a
budget that spends more than the amount specified in the budget rule, that
same majority can simply pass legislation that revises the spending limit
upwards. Hence, the rules would seem to be ineﬀective, as suggested by
Gramlich’s (1995, p. 173) comment that: “since GRH was a legislative
limit, when it became binding on the Congress, it was simply amended to
become less binding.”31 However, many observers of Congressional budgeting argue that these rules have some eﬀect on policy outcomes (e.g. Schick,
1995, Ch. 10). As Auerbach (1994, p. 155) remarks, “the political economy
of this process is not particularly well understood and, thus, merits further
attention . . .”
To illustrate this puzzle, consider the following simple game. Assume
that {GD , bD } 6= {G∗ , b∗ } and let S Aγ denotes the level of spending that
is chosen by A, subject only to BC and P, when lobbied by all the interest
groups (the corresponding budget is {G∗ , bAγ }). S BR is the budget resolution from Proposition 4 - i.e. the level of aggregate spending that maximizes
social welfare, given that A decides on the allocation of that level of spending
(under the influence of lobbying by all groups).
0) Nature selects a budget rule with a spending limit S SL = S BR
1) A proposes a budget {GP , bP }, and can also decide to propose a new
spending limit S SL
2) L votes on the proposal(s) by A as a package (i.e. on both the new S SL
and on {GP , bP } simultaneously). If the package passes, and the enacted
budget satisfies the (new) spending limit, it is implemented; otherwise, the
29

Section 312(b) of the CBA, as amended, provides that discretionary spending limits can also be enforced procedurally, rather like the budget resolution (US Library of
Congress, 2001). Thus, the analysis in Section 6 can be applied here as well.
30
Oak (1995) reviews various adjustments that have been made to the spending caps in
BEA90.
31
Gramlich (1990) analyzes the impact of the GRH rules on bargaining between
Congress and the President, and concludes that “the direct eﬀects of GRH played a very
minor role in the improvement in the U.S. budgetary position”, but concedes that the
indirect eﬀects may have been more significant (p. 75).
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default {GD , bD } is implemented
Clearly, the equilibrium outcome of this game is:
1) A proposes S SL = S Aγ and {GP , bP } = {G∗ , bAγ }
2) L votes for the package; {G∗ , bAγ } is implemented
The basic intuition is that {G∗ , bAγ } is preferred by the legislature to
the default (this follows from the fact that P is satisfied). Thus, if A has the
power to bundle an increase in the spending limit with the budget proposal,
then L will find it optimal to accept the increase in S SL . Under these
circumstances, the spending limit cannot constrain aggregate spending.
Thus, the question can be posed as follows: if overspending is due to
the ‘capture’ of those legislators with agenda setting power, why can they
not use their agenda setting power to revise budget rules that interfere with
their objectives? The argument here relies on two main assumptions. The
first is that budget rules must be complied with unless they are revised or
overturned; for instance, they are enforced through procedural rules, or there
are high political costs of violating them. This assumption is not particularly
strong, in the sense that even a constitutional budget rule that required a
supermajority to overturn would be ineﬀective if it could be ignored at will.
Secondly, the jurisdictional boundaries between committees are taken as
given.32
Returning to the simple game sketched above, suppose now that the
power to propose changes to existing budget rules does not rest with A.
The obvious candidate for agenda setting power in this area is the Rules
Committee,33 although there are other possibilities, including the Budget
Committee.34 Here, the Rules Committee (R) will be assumed to be the
agenda setter on changes to budget rules.35 It is not of central importance
for the model exactly who has this power, as long as it is not A. Thus,
introducing R into the model, the game becomes:
0) Nature selects a budget rule with a spending limit S SL = S BR∗ (where
32
See the discussion in Section 3.3 above. It is assumed that these jurisdictional property
rights are enforced through some exogenous mechanism.
33
More specifically, the subcommittee on Legislative and Budget Process of the House
Rules Committee. It was this subcommittee that held hearings on the ‘Comprehensive
Budget Process Reform’ bill (HR 853) in 1999, and on a proposal for biennial budgeting
in July, 2001.
34
Joyce (1992) describes hearings, held in late 1991 by the House Budget Committee
and the House Government Operations Committee, on revising BEA90. What is noteworthy here is that the committees considering such revisions are not the Appropriations
Committees.
35
Note that, if diﬀerent committees report out diﬀerent versions of a bill to change
budget rules, R would play a crucial role in determining which version reaches the floor.
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S BR∗ is the optimal choice of S by B, as defined in Section 5)36
1) R decides whether to propose a new spending limit S SL
2) A proposes a budget {GP , bP }
3) L votes on the proposal(s) by R and A as a package (i.e. on both
the new S SL and on {GP , bP } simultaneously). If the package passes, and
the enacted budget satisfies the (new) spending limit, it is implemented;
otherwise, the default {GD , bD } is implemented
By analogy with the neutrality result in Section 5, if interest groups can
freely lobby both R and A, then each committee will have the same objective
function. Thus, R’s preferred budget will be {G∗ , bAγ }, and the equilibrium
will involve R proposing S SL = S Aγ , A proposing {G∗ , bAγ }, L voting for
the package, and {G∗ , bAγ } being implemented. Once again, the spending
limit is ineﬀective.
Now suppose that, as in the more general model of Section 5, each interest group faces a resource constraint, and chooses the allocation of lobbying
eﬀort among R and A. As before, let yk be group k’s resources, and γ k
be the fraction of those resources allocated to lobbying A. Then, between
stages 0 and 1, each interest group k = 1, ..., K noncooperatively chooses
γ k ∈ [0, 1]. The equilibrium is:
Proposition 7 Suppose that K is suﬃciently large, that {GD , bD } 6= {G∗ , b∗ },
and that nature chooses a budget rule with S SL = S BR∗ . Then, the equilibrium outcome is:
1) Each interest group k = 1, ..., K chooses γ k = 1
2) R makes no proposal to change S SL
3) A proposes the same {GB , bB } as in Proposition 4
4) L votes for A’s proposal, which is implemented
Proof. Consider A’s problem - A maximizes UA subject to BC, P and
the constraint that the (anticipated) spending limit in the budget rule S SL is
satisfied. Using ρ again to denote the multiplier on the budget rule constraint
(which is closely analogous to BRC), the FOCs are identical to those in the
proof of Proposition 4. R’s choice of proposal can be regarded as a direct
choice of ρ. Making no proposal leaves S SL = S BR∗ , with the same ρ as in
the Proposition 4 equilibrium.
36

Note that this is the socially optimal spending level, given that A has proposal power
over the composition of the budget. The results below hold for a wide range of spending
limits other than S BR∗ , but this is used for illustrative purposes (as it would be the
spending limit favored by the median legislator, if it were determined by majority voting
at the beginning of the game).
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Consider the interest groups’ allocation of lobbying eﬀort. For large K,
by the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 4, it is a dominant
strategy for each group k to set γ k = 1. Thus, R’s objective function is
simply W , which is maximized when S SL = S BR∗ (by the definition of S BR∗
in Section 5). Hence, R makes no proposal.
A maximizes UA (given that γ k = 1∀k) subject to the constraints by
proposing {GB , bB }, as in Proposition 4. As P is satisfied, L votes for the
proposal.
The basic intuition here is the following. The system of jurisdictional
property rights in Congress entails that the power to propose budget allocations and the power to propose changes in budget rules are divided among
diﬀerent agenda setters (in this case, A and R, respectively). From the viewpoint of any single interest group, lobbying R amounts to providing a public
good for all groups, as an increase in the spending limit leads to increased
subsidies for all organized sectors. When the number of groups is large, each
has an incentive to not provide this public good, and instead to focus on
obtaining private goods from A. Consequently, R has no incentive to cooperate with A to increase the spending limit. Thus, a spending limit, even if
it is part of a budget rule that can be overturned by a simple majority, can
constrain aggregate spending.

8

Discussion and Conclusion

This paper has sought to develop an explanation of how the Congressional
budget process created by CBA74 can constrain aggregate spending below
the level that would be chosen residually in the appropriations process. It
thus revisits a question addressed earlier by Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987).
However, whereas they use a spatial approach that is more characteristic of
political science, this paper provides an alternative perspective by applying
some of the tools developed by economists in recent years for the study of
interest group lobbying.
The main results of this paper are that the aggregate level of spending
is lower, and social welfare higher, under the budget process. However,
while reducing overspending on special interest subsidies, the budget process
also leads to the underprovision of national public goods. The paper also
endogenously derives the enforcement of the budget resolution, and argues
that statutory budget rules may constrain spending, even though they can
be revised by a simple majority vote.
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The central intuition behind these results is that the budget process creates a free rider problem among the interest groups that lobby budgetary
decisionmakers. Lobbying for a larger budget resolution entails providing a
public good for all groups. In general, the groups will choose to free ride, and
focus their lobbying eﬀorts on increasing the allocations they obtain from
the Appropriations Committee. This aligns the Budget Committee’s interests with those of voters, leading it to restrain aggregate spending through
the budget resolution. Similar reasoning applies to lobbying that seeks to
change procedural or budget rules in such a way as to permit higher aggregate spending. However, it is important that the Appropriations Committee
retains authority over the composition of spending; otherwise, the groups
would switch their lobbying eﬀorts to the Budget Committee, thereby reproducing the outcomes of the appropriations process.
A number of caveats should be expressed about this analysis. Firstly,
if the budget process game were to be repeated infinitely with the same
set of interest groups, it is theoretically possible that they would sustain
cooperation (for instance, by taking turns to lobby the Budget Committee).
Even so, however, the budget process would still lead to lower spending than
under the appropriations process. Moreover, the large number of groups and
their changing composition and interests make such cooperation unlikely in
practice.
It has been suggested by observers of Congressional budgeting that the
Budget Committees have a more partisan atmosphere than the Appropriations Committees. This, combined with institutional features such as the
short terms of House Budget Committee members, may imply that they
are less able to bargain with interest groups than are the Appropriations
Committees. Even so, however, the mechanism identified in this paper can
complement such explanations of the budget process.
Finally, this analysis applies primarily to discretionary spending. As emphasized by Gramlich (1995), Davis (1997) and others, however, entitlement
spending plays an increasingly central role in Federal budgeting. This is an
issue to be addressed in future research. It should be noted that the framework of this paper (with dispersed, nationwide interest groups) appears a
more promising starting point for such an analysis than do earlier models of
local public goods and distributive politics.
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Table 1: Federal Outlays (as a % of GDP) 1962-2000
Period (fiscal years)
1962-1974
1975-2000

Annual Average Outlays (as % of GDP)
18.9%
21.2%

Source: Based on figures reported in Congressional Budget Office (2001), Appendix
F, Table 5
Table 1: Federal Discretionary Outlays (as a % of GDP) 1962-2000
Period (fiscal years)
1962-1974
1975-2000

Annual Average Discretionary Outlays (as % of GDP)
11.8%
8.9%

Source: Based on figures reported in Congressional Budget Office (2001), Appendix
F, Table 11
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Figure 2: The Budget Process
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Figure 3: The Budget Process with Points of Order and Reconciliation
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Figure 4: The Impact of Statutory Budget Rules
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